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I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 2003 the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) added section
223 to the Internal Revenue Code, creating a federal tax subsidy for money
contributed to (and earnings accumulated on) health savings accounts, or HSAs.
Though public attention was largely focused at that time on the provisions of the
MMA creating the new Medicare prescription drug benefit, the MMA was also a
major victory for advocates of "consumer-driven health care" who believe that
HSAs have the potential to control the cost and improve the quality of health care in
the United States, and perhaps even to increase health care access.2
Consumer-driven health care advocates believe that the key reason health care
costs are out of control in the United States is that most Americans are too
generously insured.3 They believe the solution is to increase consumer sensitivity to
cost and effectiveness by making people spend their own money for health care.4
People should make health care purchasing decisions just as they make purchasing
decisions for everything else: by evaluating the costs and benefits of health care and
balancing their preferences for it with their preferences for other goods and services.
t Robert L. Willett Family Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
Affiliate Professor, Department of Health Administration, Virginia Commonwealth University.
It Fred D. and Elizabeth L. Turnage Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest
University. My work on this article was supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation through
its program Investigators in Health Policy Research. This article does not necessarily represent the
views of the Foundation or the Investigator's Program, however.SMedicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071 (2003).
2 See generally CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS
AND POLICY MAKERS (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., Jossey-Bass 2004) [hereinafter CONSUMER-DRIVEN
HEALTH CARE].
3 See, e.g., NEWT GINGRICH, WINNING THE FUTURE: A 21ST CENTURY CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA 110-11 (2005); Michael Tanner, What's Wrong with the Present System?, in EMPOWERING
HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS THROUGH TAX REFORM, 27, 29-30 (Grace-Marie Arnett ed., University of
Michigan Press 1999). See also, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT: TRANSMITTED TO THE
CONGRESS 2004, H.R. Doc. No. 108-145, at 194-96 (2004) (arguing that excess insurance is a
fundamental cause of high health care costs in the United States), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudgetlfyO5/pdf/2004_erp.pdf." See GINGRICH, supra note 3, at 110-13.
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If consumers are forced to do so, providers and professionals will lower their prices
to compete seriously for the consumer dollar. On the other hand, consumers will
buy only the services they really need (or want, or can afford) and thereby reduce
utilization to the correct level. 5 Consumers will also be more sensitive to the
effectiveness of health care, since they are now spending their hard-earned dollars to
buy it. Finally, as costs come down health care will become more affordable to
those who currently consume too little of it.
6
Consumer-driven health care advocates believe that imposing higher deductibles
is the most effective way to turn patients into consumers.7 They argue that
individuals should be encouraged to buy high-deductible health plans (I-IDHPs) to
cover medical catastrophes, and spend their own money to cover routine medical
care.8 They encourage the establishment of HSAs to help assure that money is
available to cover routine costs and to equalize the tax treatment of insured and out-
of-pocket medical spending.9 The MMA does this by offering three tax benefits: tax
deductions for funds that HSA holders contribute to their HSAs (regardless of
whether the account holder files an itemized return), exclusion from income and
payroll taxation for funds employers contribute to HSAs for their employees, and
freedom from taxation for accumulated earnings of HSAs.10  The HSA must,
however, be coupled with a HDFIP, which must have a deductible of $1,000-$5,000
a year for a single individual, or $2,000-$10,000 a year for family coverage."1 The
tax subsidies for contributions to the HSA, moreover, only apply to amounts limited
to the lesser of the deductible of the insurance plan or $2250 for individual coverage
and $4500 for family coverage (indexed for inflation), though people over 55 are
allowed to make additional "catch-up" contributions.12
Money contributed to a HSA is not subject to income tax if it is spent on
"qualified medical expenses"'13 but is subject to both income tax and to a 10% excise
tax if it is used for other purposes.14 "Qualified medical expenses" are broadly
defined, however, to include many things traditional health insurance does not cover
such as nonprescription drugs, transportation or lodging while away from home to
S See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: THE FREE-ENTERPRISE
ALTERNATIVE TO CLINTON'S HEALTH PLAN, 18-27 (1994).
6 See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 2, at 69, 98.
7 GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 83-88.
8 id.
9 See id. at 88-92.
10 I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(19), 106(d), 223(a)-(b), 223(e), 3231(e)(11), 3306(b)(18) (West 2005). See
Bob Lyke, Chris Peterson & Neela Ranade, Health Savings Accounts, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE (March 23, 2005), at 3-11; Richard L Kaplan, Who's Afraid of Personal Responsibility?
Health Savings Accounts and the Future ofAmerican Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535 (2005)
(explaining the provisions of the MMA).
11 I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(A)(i) (West 2005). The insurer, however, may cover preventive
medical expenses, such as the cost of screenings or vaccinations, before the deductible is met. I.R.C.
§ 223(c)(2)(C) (West 2005); I.R.S. Notice 2004-23, 2004-1 C.B. 725. The policy must also limit out-
of-pocket expenses to no more than $5000 per year for single coverage, $10,000 per year for family
coverage. I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2005). These amounts will be indexed for inflation. I.R.C.
§ 223(g) (West 2005).
12 I.R.C. § 223(b)(2)-(3) (West 2005). See also U.S. Treasury - HSA Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.treas.gov/offices/public-affairslhsa/faq_contributing.shtml#hsalO (last visited
Oct. 4, 2005). Persons aged 55 to 65 may also make an additional "catch up" contribution. I.R.C. §
223(b)(3)(A) (West 2005)."13 I.R.C. § 223()(1) (West 2005)."14 I.R.C. § 223(f(2), 223(f)(4)(A) (West 2005).
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receive medical care, or long term care insurance premiums.15 If HSA funds are not
spent for health care, they can be withdrawn for any purpose once the account holder
dies, becomes disabled, or reaches the age of 65.16
The consumer-driven health care vision and strategy is very controversial.
Many health care policy experts believe that HSAs will do little to control health
care costs or improve quality, and are likely to diminish access to health care by
further fragmenting the insurance market.' 7 The purpose of this article, however, is
not to join this debate. Rather, our aim is to explore the regulatory issues that HSAs
and HDHPs raise. Consumer-driven health care in general, and HSAs in particular,
are major federal health policy initiatives, yet they raise a host of regulatory and
health policy considerations that traditionally have been the province of the states.
Therefore, understanding the interplay of federal and state oversight in this field is
critical. For instance, some consumer-driven advocates complain that "state laws
are getting in the way" of HSAs,18 yet the sale of these products is increasing
rapidly,' 9 perhaps so rapidly that the states will not be able to fully think through the
issues they raise before they capture a significant market share. There are legitimate
concerns that state and federal regulatory policies may not be well-coordinated in
this quickly developing new approach to health care finance and delivery.
To explore these issues, we begin by considering broadly the federalism issues
raised by health insurance generally. We then focus more particularly on how these
issues play out in the context of HSAs and HDHPs. We base our analysis in large
part on twenty-two interviews we conducted in the spring of 2005 with a total of
thirty-two regulators, insurance company and trade association representatives,
independent experts, and HSA advocacy groups.
II. FEDERALISM IN HEALTH CARE REGULATION
Throughout the last half-century, both the federal and state governments have
played a major role in regulating health insurance in the United States. Their
respective jurisdictions have evolved over time, and a variety of approaches to
sharing and allocating authority have emerged.20 A dominant theme-arguably the
dominant theme-has been federal deference to state regulation. From the Supreme
Court's 1868 decision in Paul v. Virginia that "[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not
a transaction in commerce,"21 until the 1940s, insurance regulation was regarded as
exclusively a state concern. In 1944 the Supreme Court reversed its position in
is I.R.C. § 213(d) (West 2005); Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-38, I.R.B. 559; Notice 2004-2,
2004-2 I.R.B. 269 272.
16 I.R.C. § 223(f)(4)(B), (0(4)(C) (West 2005).
"17 See, e.g., Karen Davis, Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will it Improve Health System
Performance?, 39:4 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1219 (2004); John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health
Care and the Chronically I11, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531 (2005); Katherine Swartz, Informed
Consumer - Caveat Emptor, 42 INQUIRY 3 (2005); Paul B. Ginsburg, Tax-Free But of Little Account,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 16, 2004, http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/653/.
18 Sarah Lueck, Congress Created Health Savings Accounts to Help People Cover Medical
Costs. But State Law are Getting in the Way, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, at R4; See also Jerry
Geisel, State Laws May Stymie HSA Development, Bus. INS., May 30, 2005, at 11.
19 From all accounts, the MMA strategy has been spectacularly successful. By March of
2005, an estimated 1,031,000 people had opened MMA compliant HSAs and purchased MMA
compliant HDHP policies. AHIP, Number of HSA Plans Exceeded One Million in March 2005. See
www.ahip.org for the most current statistics.
20 See Symposium, Federalism In Health Care, 3 HOus. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 151 (2003).
21 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
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United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,22 recognizing that
insurance did involve interstate commerce. The following year, however, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act 23 rearticulated the position that insurance regulation is
principally the domain of the states, and that Congress preempts state regulation
only if it clearly and considerately expresses an intent to do so.
Federal deference to state law is also evident in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).24 In general ERISA, which was intended to
bring national uniformity to employee pension and benefit law, preempts state laws
that "relate to" an employee benefit plan.25 At the same time, however, ERISA
explicitly "saves" from preemption state laws that regulate insurance,26 assuring that
most issues affecting insured employee benefit plans are governed by state rather
than federal law. Recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting ERISA have
emphasized the expansive state regulatory authority over insured ERISA plans.
27
ERISA's complex preemption provisions also demonstrate other Congressional
approaches to health insurance regulation. The Supreme Court has interpreted
ERISA's "deemer" clause, which provides that ERISA plans "shall not be deemed to
be an insurance company or any other insurer," as preempting all state laws that
relate to self-insured employee benefit plans.2 8  ERISA also preempts ordinary
contract law of the states that duplicate its exclusive remedies.2 Section 502 of
ERISA provides a cause of action exclusively in federal court and under federal law,
"to recover benefits due ... under the terms of [the ERISA] plan, to enforce...
rights under the plan, or to clarify... rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan,"30 and preempts all state law to the contrary. ERISA regulations issued by the
Department of Labor further provide a detailed federal scheme for claims
determination and internal review by ERISA plans.3 In these respects, ERISA has
replaced state insurance law with federal.
With regard to other issues, however, federal law simply preempts state law
without replacing it with federal regulation, essentially leaving a regulatory vacuum.
The most notable example is ERISA's approach to common law or statutory claims
against managed care plans for extra-contractual damages. 32 Here ERISA preempts
22 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
2 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1015 (2000).
24 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
2 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2000).
26 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
27 See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002); New York State
Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 662 (1995); See also
Robert F. Rich & Christopher T. Erb, The Two Faces of Managed Care Regulation & Policymaking,
16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233 (2005) (examining the early judicial tendency to allow significant
preemption of state managed care laws and the more recent tendency to grant considerable deference
to state managed care laws).28 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990).
29 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2495-96, (2004); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1987).30 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
31 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2004). ERISA is not the only statute through which Congress has
preempted state insurance law and replaced it with federal law. The 1997 Balanced Budget Act, for
example, preempts state regulation of provider-sponsored Medicare managed care organizations,
placing them instead under federal regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-25(a)(2) (2000). See also 42 C.F.R.
§ 422.402(a) (2004) (generally preempting state law regulating Medicare managed care organizations
when it is inconsistent with federal regulation).
32 See Aetna, 124 S.Ct. at 2503.(Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring). Another example is the
1974 federal HMO statute, which preempts some state laws governing federally-qualified HMOs that
were viewed as obstructive to the development of this desirable form of health care finance and
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all state claims but offers no federal remedy. More broadly, self-insured ERISA
plans are exempt from state regulation and only subject to limited federal
regulation.33 With respect to many issues where states see regulation as appropriate,
self-insured plans are simply unregulated. Congress is currently considering
legislation for preempting state regulation of association health plans that reflects
this same approach.34
State law preemption with and without replacement federal regulation does not
exhaust the possibilities for dividing federal/state authority in health insurance
regulation. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
represents yet another approach.35 Several provisions of HIPAA impose direct
federal regulatory control over insurers themselves, but allow the states to
supplement federal regulation as long as the state regulation is not less restrictive
than the federal law.36 HIPAA's provisions limiting preexisting conditions clauses,
for example, establish a federal floor for regulation but allow the states to impose
more restrictive requirements. 37 Several states have done so.38 HIPAA's privacy
requirements for health information also are subject to more restrictive state
regulation.
39
Finally, in at least one instance the federal government has attempted to
encourage the states themselves to regulate insurance, imposing federal regulation
only if the states fail to take up the challenge. HIPAA requires insurers that sell in
the individual market to offer insurance to individuals who lose group insurance
coverage unless the state in which they are doing business provides an alternative
approach to insuring individuals.40 Most states have taken an alternative approach
by covering individuals through high-risk pools.
41
Despite the variety of these approaches to federalism, the general trend is
toward greater federal involvement in health insurance regulation. Health care
finance and delivery raises issues of national importance that are frequently viewed
as calling for uniform or consistent national solutions. Rarely are these issues
considered purely local concerns, and only a minority of policy advocates see the
virtue in pursuing a "laboratory" of state experimentation with widely different
delivery. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (2000). The federal HMO Act, however, does not directly regulate
HMOs, other than to specify the terms for federal qualification and hence protection from obstructive
state laws. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2000).
33 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Their internal claims practices are subject to 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-25(a)(2), and 42 C.F.R. § 422.402(a), but they are otherwise largely
unregulated.
34 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Elliot K. Wicks, & Janice S. Lawlor, HealthMarts, HIPCs,
MEIVAs, andAssociation Health Plans: A Guide for the Perplexed, 20(1) HEALTH AFFAIRS 142, 142-
143 (Jan./Feb. 2001).
35 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1182(2000); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41(2000).
36 See generally Colleen Medill, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in
the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485 (1998); Jack Rovner, Federal
Regulation Comes to Private Health Care Financing, 7 ANN. HEALTH L. 183 (1998); Symposium,
Making a Federal Case out of Health Care, 22(1) CATO J. 1 (Spr./Sum. 2002).37 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41(a), 44.
39 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS REP. 99-100, PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING 1996 FEDERAL STANDARDS (1999),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/I 999/he991 00.pdf.
39 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§264(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2033 (Recommendations with Respect to Privacy of Certain Health Information)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2000)); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2004).
40 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41(b).
41 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 38.
399
400 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 31 NO. 4 2005
approaches or non-approaches to possible solutions. 42 Increasingly, there is a shared
sense that the most effective path toward reform is through federal leadership and
oversight.43 This was the path taken for promoting HMOs, for ensuring portability
and accessibility of group health insurance coverage, and for protecting medical
privacy. At first glance, this also appears to be the path for consumer-driven health
care.
Closer inspection reveals, however, that Congress has taken a quite different
approach in the MMA. The remarkable aspect of the MMA's provisions regulating
HSA/HDHPs is the indirection of its regulatory strategy. The MMA does not
require anything of health insurers or the states; however, it also does not explicitly
free insurers from any state requirements. Rather the MMA simply offers federal
tax subsidies for contributions individuals or employers make to an HSA that is
coupled with a HDHP, and for the earnings of those accounts.44 The MMA does not
require insurers to offer such policies. It does not compel states to require insurers
to offer such policies. It does not even require the states to allow conforming high
deductible insurance policies to be sold. It simply makes it clear that states that
prohibit such policies will deprive their residents of access to a generous federal tax
subsidy. The Department of the Treasury has issued a notice that allows states until
the end of 2005 to eliminate state statutes that block such high-deductible policies.
45
The law does not compel the states to eliminate these barriers, however. Therefore,
although HSAs are one of the major federal health policy initiatives of our time,
states may completely block or fail to implement them if they desire.
The use of tax subsidies to effect health insurance regulation is not original to
the MMA. Arguably the single most important federal intervention in the health
insurance market is the government's provision of tax subsidies for employment-
related health insurance found in the 1954 federal income tax amendments.4 6 More
recently, federal tax subsidies have also been extended to subsidize health care
flexible spending accounts, the purchase of health insurance by the self-employed,
and most recently health reimbursement accounts.47  Tax incentives were also
available for Archer Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs), which preceded the HSA.48
However, with the exception of the MSA statute, which was adopted for a limited
time and applied to only very limited circumstances, these tax subsidies are not
linked to particular forms of insurance and do not affect state attempts to regulate
insurance. The MMA represents, therefore, an innovative approach to federalism
health policy: regulation (and deregulation) through tax subsidies rather than through
preemption.
A key policy question, therefore, is how the states have responded and will
respond to this federal invitation to allow an innovative form of insurance. Has the
42 See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and the New Governance: Advocating
for Healthcare, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575, 580-81 (2002) (discussing a "movement of authority
downward from federal to state and municipal governments").
43 See, e.g., TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? 162-78 (Oxford University Press
2003); John D. Blum, Overcoming Managed Care Regulatory Chaos Through a Restructured
Federalism, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 327 (2001); Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation
of Managed Health Care:The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251 (1997).
44 See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
45 I.R.S. Notice 2004-43, 2004-27 I.R.B. 10.
46 See JOST, supra note 43, at 77-80; See generally MARK V. PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT
WORK (University of Michigan Press 1998).
47 See Paul Fronstin, Health Savings Accounts and Other Account-Based Health Plans, EBRI
ISSUE BRIEF No. 273 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, D.C.) (Sept. 2004).
48 Id. at 6.
STATE REGULATION IN CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE
possibility of a tax subsidy for their residents been sufficient to entice the states to
remove regulatory barriers to HSAs and high-deductible insurance policies?
Alternatively, do the states have their own concerns about HSAs or HDHPs that
have produced regulation limiting their availability? Can the carrot of federal tax
interventions alone effectively lead state health insurance regulatory policy? This
article addresses these questions.
III. OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE REGULATION
Health insurance is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the United
States.49 One would expect, therefore, that a major innovation such as consumer-
driven health care would encounter state regulatory issues on a number of fronts.50
We outline the possibilities by focusing separately on HSAs and HDHPs.
HSAs raise a number of state law and policy issues. The most direct issue of
public policy that states face in dealing with HSAs is whether to confer a state tax
break on funds deposited in HSAs similar to that conferred by federal law. This is
obviously a legislative and revenue issue rather than a question of insurance
regulation. HSAs also raise regulatory issues. HSAs are not insurance, they are
financial accounts, and so their regulation depends on the nature of the institution
that administers the account. If a financial institution, such as a bank or credit
union, administers the account, then HSAs present no especially unique issues.
However, the MMA HSA provisions also allow insurers (as well as "other persons")
to serve as trustees or custodians of HSAs.51 Some insurers may want to administer
their own HSAs, devoting some of their capital reserves to developing this new
expertise and product line, and perhaps putting some of their capital at risk in
managing investments. If so, this may raise concerns for regulatory oversight of
insurer solvency and financial accounting.
Another regulatory issue raised by HSAs is the treatment of provider networks
with whom insurers may contract in order to offer their HSA holders access to health
care items or services at a discount. These can come in two forms. We learned
through our interviews that, for qualified medical expenses the HDHP does not
cover, such as eye glasses or massage therapy, some HSA marketers offer "discount
only" plans or cards that give account holders access to a discounted network of
service providers. Discount arrangements may also apply to medical services that
are covered by the HDHP but are subject to the high deductible. Health plans
negotiate discounted payment rates with networks of providers that not only
decrease the direct cost to the health plan for insured services but also obligate these
providers to charge lower rates for services paid by the patient that are subject to the
deductible. 52 Both types of discount arrangements raise regulatory questions. For
49 See BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW, 461-508 (2d ed. 2000). (describing health
insurance regulation in the United States).
50 See generally Mila Kofman, Health Savings Accounts: Issues and Implementation
Decisions for States, ISSUE BRIEF, (AcademyHealth State Coverage Initiatives, D.C.), Sept. 2004
(explaining "the key issues that state officials need to know about HSAs-including what they are,
how they compare to other types of tax-preferred accounts, and what public policy implications and
implementation issues need to be considered.), available at
http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebrief904.pdf.
51 26 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (2005).
52 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 625-
626 (5th ed. 2004).
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instance, are "discount only" plans subject to insurance regulation at all? 53 If not,
might they cause consumer confusion and therefore be subject to other non-
insurance consumer protection laws.5 4  And do rules that govern managed care
provider networks-such as network adequacy, any-willing provider, and provider
due process rights55 -apply to HDHP provider networks when they are being used
for services paid for from the HSA?
A final HSA issue arises from a Department of Labor ruling that HSAs are not
considered employee benefit plans subject to ERISA, even if they are partly funded
by employers and are tied to an employer-sponsored HDHP because employees
personally own these accounts.5 6 Professor Jacobi first noted that this ruling may
surprisingly open a door to state policy initiatives that were previously considered
preempted by ERISA.57  If employer-funded HSAs are not subject to regulation
under ERISA, then logically they are also not subject to ERISA preemption. This
could mean that states have the power to mandate that employers offer or fund
HSAs-a radical change from the traditional understanding that states may never
impose direct benefit mandates on employers.
Turning next to the high deductible health plan, a state contemplating regulation
encounters the full range of regulatory issues presented by any health plan. The
most obvious state regulatory obstacle HDHPs face is whether state law permits the
size of deductibles that federal law requires in order to obtain favorable tax
treatment of HSA funds. Two sources of possible noncompliance exist. First, when
states mandate inclusion of particular benefits, they frequently require that those
benefits be subject to low or no patient cost-sharing, in order to prevent insurers
from circumventing the benefit mandate.5 8 Second, HMOs as originally conceived
typically provide virtually "first-dollar" prepaid coverage for a comprehensive range
of health care services, and therefore state enabling acts or regulations may prevent
HMOs from offering high-deductible policies.59
Less obvious regulatory issues spring from rules that govern how health
insurance is priced and underwritten in the individual and small group markets.
Especially for the small group market, most states restrict in some fashion (ranging
from community rating to rating bands) the extent to which an insurer may vary its
rates among subscribers based on their individual health status.60 At the same time,
states require that rates be actuarially fair.61  Because high-deductible plans are
53 See Gerard Britton, Discount Medical Plans and the Consumer: Health Care in a
Regulatory Blindspot, 16 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 97, 111-12 (2004).
s4 Id. at 112-15.
5S See generally Mark A. Hall, Managed Care Patient Protection or Provider Protection? A
Qualitative Assessment, 117 AM. J. MED. 932 (2004).56 Robert J. Doyle, United States Department of Labor, Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-1 (Apr.
7, 2004), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab-2004-l.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).57 Jacobi, supra note 17, at 579.
58 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §17:48-6m (West 1996 & Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§17:48E-35.10 (West 1996 & Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-46.11 (West 1996 & Supp.
2005), requiring coverage for groups of over 50 blood lead screening for children and of any
necessary medical treatment for lead poisoned children without application of a deductible.
59 See, e.g., Charles Rapacciuolo and Thomas C. Zyra, Circular Letter No. 4 (2004) - Health
Savings Accounts and High Deductible Health Plans, N.Y. INS. DEPARTMENT (2004), available at
bttp://www.ins.state.ny.us/lc04-04.htm (New York law prohibiting 11MOs from imposing deductibles
on in-network benefits).
60 See generally Mark A. Hall, The Structure and Enforcement of Health Insurance Rating
Reforms, 37 INQUIRY 376 (2001).
61 See Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Inculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-
Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1806, 1812-14 (1987) (discussing actuarial fairness).
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known to attract healthier subscribers,62 and they also are meant to discourage excess
utilization, these plans raise the issue of whether subscribers should be fully credited
with theik lower health expenditures or instead should be charged rates based on an
insurer's overall risk pool in a given market.
Another set of issues relate to states' efforts to standardize benefit plans in order
to promote comparison shopping. A few states allow only standardized benefits to
be sold in some market segments, while many others require insurers to offer
standardized plans alongside their more tailored options.63 States must decide
whether to include HSA-qualifying high-deductible plans in this mix of standardized
benefits. Also, states that have subsidized high-risk pools for people who are
uninsurable at standard rates must decide whether to include an HDHP in the set of
plans offered through these programs.
In order to understand these issues, we conducted a series of interviews over a
three month period in the spring of 2005.64 We interviewed fourteen state insurance
regulators from nine states.65 We attempted to canvass states from different regions
of the country, including states that have a reputation for "heavy insurance
regulation" (e.g., Maryland, New Jersey and New York) or "light insurance
regulation" (e.g., Arizona, Pennsylvania and Virginia). We conducted extended
interviews with representatives of three insurers, including two of the largest
participants in the industry and one smaller boutique HSA/HDHP company. We
interviewed knowledgeable persons at America's Health Insurance Plans, the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield national association, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, and Communicating for Agriculture and the Self Insured, Inc., an
entity that follows closely developments in state high-risk plans. We also
interviewed persons connected with the Galen Institute and the National Center for
Policy Analysis, HSA advocacy groups, and an independent expert on state
insurance regulation. All totaled we spoke with thirty-three individuals representing
nineteen different entities. The interviews were conducted on a confidential basis.
While we draw on them throughout this article, we do not cite to specific interviews
in the footnotes.
IV. STATE REGULATION OF HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND HIGH
DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS
A. THE THREE BIGGEST BARRIERS: NO (OR Low) DEDUCTIBLE MANDATES, HMO
DEDUCTIBLES, AND STATE TAX SUBSIDIES
Most public discussion of state regulatory issues affecting HSAs and HDHPs to
date has centered around three issues, 66 and all three came up frequently in our
interviews. The first of these is the one issue specifically addressed by the federal
6 See Karen Davis, Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will it Improve Health System
Performance? 39 HEALTH SERVICES REs. 1219, 1224-25 (2004) (studies show some evidence of
favorable selection).
63 Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws,,32
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 685, 691 (1999)." Under the terms of our research involving human subjects protection protocol these
interviews were confidential. This is also important for protecting the commercial interests of the
private sector representatives we interviewed. For this reason we do not cite to individual interviews.
6S Arizona, California, Colorado, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and Vermont. Several of these states followed up our interview by sending us additional information." See, e.g., Geisel, supra note 18; Kofman, supra note 50; and Lueck, supra note 18.
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government-the problem of state mandates that bar high deductibles for particular
services. As noted above, HSAs only qualify for tax subsidies under the MMA if
they are coupled with HDHPs that have minimum deductibles of at least $1000 for
individuals, $2000 for families. 67 The statute allows (but does not compel) HDHPs
to have no deductibles or lower deductibles for "preventive" health services, as
defined in the Medicare statute,6 8 but does not otherwise allow particular services to
be exempt from the high deductible requirement. The Treasury Department defines
what is meant by "preventive care" and does not defer to state definitions.69
At the time the MMA was adopted, a number of states mandated coverage of
specific non-preventive health services (as defined by federal law) either without a
deductible or with a low deductible. Examples include a Florida law that prohibits
insurers from charging insurance deductibles or copayments to victims of violent
crime,70 laws in Maryland and Pennsylvania that prohibit the application of a
deductible for certain home health visits for recently delivered mothers and
newborns,71 and a Pennsylvania statute requiring coverage without a deductible for
medical foods for certain conditions.72 The Department of the Treasury, which
administers the HSA program, quickly realized the implementation problem this
created. Consequently, the Department provided an opinion that HSAs coupled with
HDHPs could qualify for the tax subsidy, even if state law compelled the HDHP to
offer low deductibles for specific services that did not qualify as preventive, but only
through December 31, 2005.73 The states effectively had a reprieve until that date to
revoke or amend their conflicting requirements. HSA tax subsidies will not be
available after this date in states that fail to do so.
Most states quickly followed suit.74 According to a survey conducted by
America's Health Plans (AHIP), by May of 2005 the legislatures of all but four
states with impediments (New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Rhode Island) had
passed laws removing the impediments, though at that point the governors in three
states had not yet signed the legislation into law (Florida, Pennsylvania, and
Texas).75 The states saw it as their responsibility to fix problems of nonconformity
so that they would not be a barrier to marketplace innovations spurred by the federal
initiative. The states' responses were remarkably rapid and widespread. Without
any specific federal requirement or threatened penalty, most were willing to set aside
the particular public health or provider protection considerations that caused them to
enact various benefits mandates in order to facilitate the federally-led consumer-
driven market initiative.
67 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(i) (2004).
68 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(C) (2004).
6' I.R.S. Notice 2004-23, 2004-1 C.B. 725, available at
http:l/www.ustreas.govlpresslreleaseslreportslnotice200423.pdf.
10 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.128 (West 2004).
71 MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-812(g)(1) (West 2002); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1583(c)
(West 1999).
7- 40 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3904, 3906(b) (West 1999).
7 I.RS. Notice 2004-43, available at
http://www.treas.gov.presslreleases/reportsln200443.pdf.
74 See AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS (AHIP), 2004 AND 2005 ENACTED/ADOPTED
HSA LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS: IMPEDIMENTS OR TAX DEDUCTION AS Of MAY 20, 2005 (on file
with authors).
"75 AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS (AHIP), STATE LAWS AFFECTING HSAS:
IMPEDIMENTS AND ' TAX TREATMENTS AS OF AUGUST 12, 2005,
http://vwv.nahu.org/government/issues/MSAs/HSAs-HSSAs/Chart%20-%2OHSA%201mpediments-
%20State%20Tax%208-12-05 l.pd (available as of Oct. 15, 2005).
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Several states, however, continue to impose nonconforming mandates. In at
least one state, New Jersey, this delay in amending mandates seems to be due at least
in part to political opposition to HSAs. Failing to revoke or amend a mandate is a
relatively low profile approach to banning HSAs from a state without necessarily
joining a high profile political debate on whether they are good public policy. In
other states, however, this noncompliance seems to be temporary, due simply to
legislative lassitude or to idiosyncratic legislative cycles. Still, this delay troubles
the industry because new insurance policy forms must be approved before they are
marketed, which causes an additional period of delay following any conforming
enactments. Also, contracts for large group insurance policies are negotiated months
in advance of their effective date, and employers are reluctant to consider HSA plans
unless they are certain they will be legally available. This combination of factors is
likely to delay the market's adoption of ESAs for some states even beyond the
January 1, 2006 deadline for states to conform their laws to federal requirements.
A second widely-recognized issue is whether HMOs can offer an HDHP. Most
insurers are structuring HDHPs as PPOs. 76 Some insurers, however, also want to
make HDHPs available as HMOs. Some see this possibility as combining the
virtues of managed and consumer-driven health care,77 others are licensed only as an
HMO, and yet others would like to offer consumers all options possible. The
traditional understanding of an HMO, however, is that it offers comprehensive
health care in exchange for a fixed premium.78 An HMO with a $1000 deductible, or
to stretch things further, a $5000 or $10,000 deductible, seems, therefore, to raise
definitional problems.
This turns out not to be a pressing problem in many states. Many either
explicitly allow HMOs to have deductibles or have been willing to stretch their state
law definitions of HMOs to allow HDHPs. Some, like Virginia have explicitly
amended their HMO statutes to allow HDHPs coupled with HSAs.79 Others, like
Connecticut, have interpreted their insurance rules to permit high deductibles for
HSA-related plans.
In a number of states, however, including Illinois, Ohio, Maine, Missouri and
New York, state law prohibits or limits HMO deductibles.80 This is particularly
problematic in New York, where only HMOs are permitted in the non-group market.
Therefore, the New York bar on high-deductible HMOs effectively keeps HSAs
entirely out of the individual market. In most states, this market segment has had the
largest initial growth of HSAs.
81
In a number of other states, moreover, regulators expressed to us some concern
about how high HMO deductibles can go. This is Arizona's position, which has
allowed a $5,000 deductible policy, but has concerns about higher deductibles.
Vermont also believes that it could perhaps prohibit very high deductible HMOs,
and is researching this question. Regulatory policy in California is still uncertain
and emergent, with concerns expressed that a high deductible might at some point
make HMO coverage "illusory." Maryland law prohibits cost-sharing that is so high
that it creates a barrier to care, but regulators support HSAs as a matter of policy and
76 Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving Managed Health Care with Health Savings
Accounts, 24(6) HEALTH AFFAIRS 1490 (Nov./Dec. 2005).
7 Id.
78 Paul M. Ellwood, Jr. et al., Health Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291, 295 (1971).
79 VA. CODE ANN. 38.2-4303(a)(8) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
so AHIP, supra note 75.
8! AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS OFF TO A FAST
START IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET (2005), http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?docid=7418.
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would allow high deductible plans up to the federal maximum as long as preventive
care is subject to no or low deductibles. In sum, most states are trying to permit
MMA compliant HDHP HMOs, but there might be limits to how far they are willing
to go.
The third major issue is state tax subsidies for HSAs. Twenty-seven of the
states (and the District of Columbia) simply use the federal definition of taxable
income and, therefore, automatically recognize all deductions and exclusions
available under federal law for state income tax filers, including HSA related
deductions.82 Another nine states do not have a state income tax, and thus are not in
a position to offer income tax incentives. 83 The remaining states, however, need a
specific law singling out HSAs for favorable treatment. Many states have for some
time provided state tax deductions and exclusions for Archer MSAs; indeed some
did so even before HIPAA introduced the MSA into federal law.84 In the wake of
the MMA, many states have amended their state tax laws to conform to the new
federal provisions.85
Not all have done so, however.86 The failure to provide parallel state tax
subsidies in some states may be explained again by legislative inertia. The lack of a
state tax subsidy does not bar the use of HSAs within the state, it merely makes them
a little less attractive, so states no doubt feel less urgency here than they do about
removing low or no deductible mandates. Some states never offered state tax
subsidies for the old Archer MSAs, and are not tempted to do so by the MMA HSA
provisions. In a number of states, moreover, the refusal to extend tax subsidies is
probably based on budgetary concerns, since many states currently experience
continuing fiscal difficulties. 87 Those states that have decoupled state tax deductions
and exclusions from those found under the federal law have become grudging about
offering new state tax subsidies. Governor Jim Doyle of Wisconsin vetoed a tax
subsidy for HSAs in 2004, stating that it would cause Wisconsin to lose $39 million
in revenue over eight years.88 Finally, some states are also using this approach
because they question HSAs as a matter of public policy. Wisconsin's Governor
Doyle also expressed concern that a tax subsidy for HSAs would encourage
employers to reduce the generosity of health benefits. 89 The bottom line, however,
is that most states currently offer state tax subsidies for contributions to HSAs that
conform to federal requirements.
Beyond these three main issues, few of the sources we interviewed believed
there are other major state-law barriers to HSAs. One advocacy group representative
and one insurance company representative asserted that states were slow to issue
necessary approvals and rulings on new HDHP policies because of their general
hostility to consumer-driven health care, but the other insurers whom we interviewed
did not raise this as an independent issue (indeed one stated that it had not
experienced unexpected delays). Another state insurance regulation expert we
s2 AHIP, supra note 75, at 2.
83 See generally id.
4 See Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, State Legislative Health Care and Insurance
Issues, 2003 SURVEY OF PLANS, 80-82 (2003).
95 AHIP, supra note 75.
86 See id. at 2 (according to AHIP's survey, eight had failed to do so).
s7 See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, STATE FISCAL CONDITIONS
AND MEDICAID (Nov. 2004),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=49527.
98 Lueck, supra note 18, at R4.
89 Id.
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interviewed suggested that any delay was probably due to the innate conservatism of
state insurance regulators faced with a new and unfamiliar product, and not to any
particular hostility toward HSA/HDHPs. In sum, most persons we interviewed
agreed that the vast majority of states do not currently impose significant barriers for
insurers who want to offer MMA-compliant policies. The most significant problems
are that not all states allow HMO high-deductible policies, and not all offer state tax
benefits that parallel the federal deduction.
V. OTHER STATE REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY MMA COMPLIANT
HSAS AND HDHPS
The current issues raised by insurers and regulators do not exhaust the range of
potential regulatory issues. As the states gain more experience with HSAs and
HDHPs, they may well encounter a range of additional regulatory issues. Early
recognition of these issues is important because it enables states to deal with them
responsibly rather than waiting for a crisis to provoke precipitous or over-reactive
action. Experiences from managed care regulation in the 1990s reveal that case-
specific or crisis-driven regulation is often neither efficient nor effective. 90
A. STATE REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY HSAs.
First, how the health savings accounts are administered may raise several state
regulatory issues. A number of the large insurers with whom we spoke, including
Aetna, United, and the Blues plans, do not administer these accounts themselves.
United, for example, has acquired a bank (Exante) which manages its HSAs, while
Aetna has partnered with J.P. Morgan for this purpose. The Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Plans have approved debit cards featuring the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Logo for use with HSAs, but banks will administer the HSAs.91 This approach
offers a number of advantages, including access to banking experience and FDIC
insurance. Other insurers, however, including Destiny Health, one of the largest
boutique HDHP insurers, administer their own HSAs.
One of the essential functions of insurance regulation is to assure that insurers
have sufficient capital and reserves to meet their obligations as those obligations
become due. 92 Because funds in HSAs can be carried over from year to year,
insurers that administer _HSAs could potentially accumulate large sums of money for
which they are responsible. Most insurers, however, have little experience
functioning as banks. The process of managing and investing assets, receiving
deposits, processing checks and debit card transactions, and providing account
statements may be new to them.
Under the MMA, HSA's may be administered by banks, insurance companies or
"another person who demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary [of the
Treasury] that the manner in which such person will administer the trust will be
consistent with the requirements of this section."93 Banks are regulated by the
90 See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong With a Patient Bill of
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221 (2000); Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care: A Policy
Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUiS U. L.J. 365 (2003).
91 See Press Release, BlueCross BlueShield Association, BCBSA Approves Use of Blue-
Branded Debit Cards for Tax-Favored Health Savings Accounts (Feb. 1, 2005), available at
http://bcbshealthissues.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=144430.
92 FURROW, supra note 49, at § 9-1.
93 26 U.S.C.S. § 223(d)(l)(B) (LEXIS 2005).
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FDIC, Comptroller of the Currency, or state banking regulators. Administrators
other than banks or insurers are regulated by the federal government in the same way
401(k) administrators are, and as such are subject to a reasonably thorough
regulatory process. 94  Most states, however, do not appear to have a regulatory
mechanism that oversees insurers offering financial services. None of our interview
sources could point to any actual regulatory requirements or consequences for
insurers that administer their own HSAs, other than that the funds must be
maintained in a separate account and must not be commingled with insurer funds
that are at risk. If these funds are kept separate from the insurer's other funds, then
they are not subject to, and do not affect, the insurer's solvency and reserve
requirements.
The financial institutions, other than insurers, that the MMA authorizes to
administer HSAs are familiar types of heavily regulated financial entities.
Consumers who choose insurers to administer their HSAs will likely assume there is
some similar oversight of financial services from insurers. Questions will
undoubtedly surface about state regulatory oversight the first time HSA holders (or
providers who expect to be paid by HSAs) encounter major problems in getting an
insurance administrator to honor checks or debit card transactions. Why did
insurance regulators allow the problem to arise? Will state insurance guaranty funds
cover the obligations of insolvent insurers under their HSAs, or only under their
HDHPs? Do unfair claims practice laws cover HSA claims? We found little
evidence in our interviews that insurers or insurance regulators were considering
these issues.
95
A second issue HSAs raise is how state statutes and regulations that regulate
managed care will apply to HSA transactions. As noted above, managed care uses a
number of tools to control health care utilization and prices, including provider
networks, utilization review, and provider payment incentives. 96 Perceived excesses
in the application of these tools have in turn resulted in extensive state regulation of
managed care.97 Although these laws clearly apply to the portion of services the
HDHP insures, whether they apply to covered services below the deductible or to
other services paid from HSAs but not covered by the HDHP is unclear.
All of the HDHP insurers with whom we spoke make their negotiated network
discounts available to HSA holders. This is a great advantage to HSA owners, as it
gives them the benefit of the considerable market power that insurers command for
extracting discounts from providers.98 Insurers also use their standard claims
processing systems, including medical necessity review, to determine when the
policy deductible (and, ultimately, the out-of-pocket maximum) has been met for
any particular subscriber. In general, only insured expenses can be counted against a
deductible. If a subscriber with a $3,000 deductible receives an outpatient surgery
costing $2,500, insurers are unlikely to credit the cost of the surgery fully against the
94 See I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, Q&A 72 (Aug. 10, 2004), available at
http://vww.treas.govlpresslreleases/reports/hsanotice200450072304.pdf (referencing Treas. Reg. §
1.408-2(e)).
"95 This may well be because most insurers we spoke with have decided to avoid these
concerns altogether by using banks to administer HSAs, and the one insurer we spoke with who is
administering its own accounts has considerable experience with consumer-driven health care. But it
was surprisingly difficult to locate anyone who had thought through this problem.
9 See Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think About "Managed Care",
32 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 661 (1999).
9 See FURROW, supra note 52, at 625-633.
98 Hall & Havighurst, supra note 76.
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deductible without determining whether the surgery was a covered expense, whether
$2,500 was a reasonable charge, and whether the subscriber received pre-approval
for the surgery if required under the policy. In short, even while spending their own
money from _HSAs, subscribers will be subject to some managed care controls to the
extent that they attempt to claim these expenses against their insurance deductibles.
The MMA explicitly recognizes the HDHPs' use of networks, allowing them to
impose higher out-of-pocket limits for services provided outside of the network.99
The Treasury's interpretation of the MMA also permits HDHPs to impose penalties
for the failure of insureds to seek precertification of services and these penalties do
not count against the HDHP out-of-pocket maximum, or, presumably, against the
deductible.100
This raises a host of questions, however. If an insurer refuses to credit the cost
of the surgery fully against the deductible because it was not medically necessary,
can the HSA holder appeal the decision under the state's claims review laws?' 01 If a
network provider is treating an ESA holder and that provider's contract with the
HDHP is terminated, must the provider continue to offer the HSA holder the HDHP
negotiated discount for the period of time that a state's continuity of care statute
requires the HDHP to cover services? Do state any-willing-provider statutes apply
to HDHP networks for HSA-covered services as well as for HDHP funded services
once the deductible is met? In sum, does the whole panoply of managed care
regulatory statutes also apply to HSA expenditures, at least insofar as they are
applied against HDHP deductibles?
The answer to these questions in general is yes. Virtually all regulators and
insurers we talked to assumed this to be the case, but this assumption has not yet
been challenged or tested, as it might be if, for instance, a particular provider
insisted it was not bound by the restraints in its managed care contract for services
paid directly by patients through their HSAs.102 Even if the current understanding
holds, it means that HDHPs will face no less of a restrictive regulatory environment
than do conventional managed care plans. Because many people believe that
regulation mortally wounded managed care,103 this realization might cause states to
consider whether some aspects of existing regulation will deter appropriate
development or operation of HSAs[HD1-IPs.
The interplay between the HSA and _HDHP does not just raise questions as to
how state managed care regulations apply; it also presents the very real potential for
consumer misunderstanding and confusion.14 To understand clearly how MMA
HSAs work when coupled with HDHPs, consumers first need to realize that HSAs
are savings accounts, not insurance. Not all consumers will understand this,
especially since, as one regulator noted, some HSAs and HDHPs are being
misleadingly marketed as providing seamless coverage. Next, consumers must
appreciate that HSAs can pay for a broader range of qualified medical services than
S26 U.S.C.S. § 223(c)(2)(D)(i) (LEXIS 2005).
"0 I.R.S. 2004-50, Q&A 16, 18, 19; Treas. Notice 2004-2, Q&A 4 (Dec. 22, 2003), available
at http:l/www.treas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/pdf/notice2OO4-2.pdf.
101 At least forty-two states have such laws. Robert F. Rich & Christopher T. Erb, The Two
Faces of Managed Care Regulation and Policymnaking, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 269 (2005).
102 See Margaret Ann Cross, Will Providers Seek New Contracts as Consumer-Directed Plans
Grow?, MANAGED CARE (May 2004).
103 See Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 427, 427 (2005).
104 See Sarah Rubenstein, Savings Accounts for Health Care Cause Confuision, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 30, 2004, at D3.
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those covered by the HDHP. It is easy to imagine some consumers exhausting their
HSAs on miscellaneous expenses that do not count toward the deductible at all and
then facing the rude surprise of "catastrophic" medical expenses once a serious
accident or illness strikes and learning that insurance coverage is still a long way off.
Insurance regulators will undoubtedly be drawn into these controversies from time to
time. Even in more routine circumstances, keeping track of two different categories
of medical expenses-those the HSA covers and those the HDHP covers-is bound
to cause confusion and consternation. Added to this consumer burden are the
already confusing distinctions between billed versus allowable charges, and in-
network versus out-of-network providers, which bedevil all but the most expert
readers of insurers' "explanation of benefits" forms. All of this is to say that
HSA/HDHPs raise significant issues for consumer education and dispute resolution,
and that these issues will likely reach the attention of state insurance regulators.
Consumer confusion and misunderstanding is particularly possible where HSAs
offer "discount only" plans to their account holders alongside HDHPs. A number of
insurers offer their HSA account holders negotiated discounts with providers of
noninsured qualified medical services, such as optical services or massage
therapy.105 Regulators we spoke with acknowledged that such discount plans could
raise a number of issues, such as consumer misunderstanding of the terms, plan
marketers' misrepresentation of the scope or nature of benefits, or provider
misunderstanding of participation arrangements. Both consumers and providers may
not understand, for example, that services covered through the discount arrangement
are not covered services, and therefore are not insured even if the deductible is
exceeded. In non-HSA contexts, there are reports that consumers who buy into such
arrangements sometimes believe they are buying true insurance rather than merely
access to a network of discounted providers. 10 6 In non-HSA contexts, moreover,
discount plans have involved "rented" preexisting PPO networks assembled for
other purposes, and serious misunderstandings have resulted when providers have
found themselves obligated to provide discounted services to consumers outside of
the context in which they had agreed to serve.1
07
Insurance regulators generally do not address problems that arise from discount-
only plans because they do not consider discount only plans to be insurance. 108
Rather, these products and practices are overseen by state attorneys general or
consumer protection agencies, if at all.109 Consumers who believe, however, that
discount plans are insurance products might come first to the insurance regulator for
assistance if they encounter problems. As a result, the NAIC is considering, how
these products should be regulated, and several states have adopted legislation
specifically addressing them."0
The problems that result from the high deductible feature of HDHPs and from
the insurance companies' efforts to extend benefits to their members whose
103 See generally Britton, supra note 53, at 98-101 (describing discount policies).
106 See id. at 108-10; Mila Kofman, Jennifer Libster & Eliza Bangit, Discount Medical Cards:
Innovation or Illusion? COMMONWEALTH FUND (March 2005), available at
http://www.cmwf.org/publications/publications show.htm?doe id=263783.
107 Britton, supra note 53, at 110-11. A recent survey of insurers found that 46% of high
deductible plans used "rented" networks and only 38% used "proprietary" networks for their insured
products. See Reden and Anders, Ltd., Consumer Directed Insurance Products: Survey Results April
2005, http:l/www.cahi.org/cahi-contents/consumerinfo/pdf/HSAsurveyRedenAnders0405.pdf.
108 Britton, supra note 53, at 111-12.
Sld. at 1H2.
11 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 636 (2005).
------ ----------------- ------------------------------------ 
STATE REGULATION IN CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE
expenditures are still below the deductible are not unique to HDHPs coupled with
HSAs. These problems currently exist, even 'without HSAs, under normal high
deductible policies, which are already fairly widespread.", The problems may
become more pressing under HSAs for a couple of reasons. First, if MMA
compliant policies truly become as common as their advocates claim they will, these
policies will reach many people who have had no previous experience with high
deductible policies. Many of the problems with managed care arose from consumer
unfamiliarity with this new type of insurance. 1 2 People new to consumer-driven
plans will face a similar learning curve. Second, the MMA HSA provisions, which
provide tax subsidies for HSAs coupled with policies with deductibles of up to
$5,000 for individuals and $10,000 for families, may lead to even higher deductibles
than are now common.113 This in turn will make the existing issues apply to an even
greater range of medical expenses, even for people who are already covered by high
deductible plans. A recent survey found that 90% of single policies offered to HSA
enrollees exceeded the minimum of $1,000, and 17% exceeded twice that amount.1
14
The states may therefore have to deal with these problems to a greater extent than
they have had to so far.
B. STATE REGULATIONS INTENDED TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO HEALTH INSURANCE
AND HIGH DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS
One traditional focus of state insurance regulation has been improving access to
health insurance for the uninsured by controlling insurer underwriting and rating
practices primarily in the small group market, but also in the individual market in
some states. The goal of these laws is to open the insurance market to higher risk
insurance applicants or small groups who might otherwise be excluded. This goal is
manifest in laws requiring forms of community rating, establishing high-risk pools,
and requiring the offer of standardized policies.'1
1 5
A number of commentators have expressed a concern that HDHPs might further
fragment insurers' risk pools by attracting mainly low-risk subscribers, leaving high-
risk subscribers in separate risk pools with ever increasing premiums for
"u See James Maxwell, et al., Are California's Large Employers Moving to Catastrophic
Health Insurance Coverage?, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Web Exclusive),
http://content.healthaffairs.org.cgi/reprint/hlthaa.w5.233v I ?ijkey=VflpznJFN.6Lo&keytype=ref&sitei
d=healthaff, May 2005 (reporting that 12% of large private and 5% of large public employers in
California offer high deductible PPOs, with 15% of private employees and 18% of public employees
taking up high deductible policies when offered). High deductible policies are even more common in
the individual and small group market. One recent study of adults aged 50 to 70 with individual
insurance coverage found that 42% had deductibles of $1000 or higher and 24% had deductibles of
$2000 or higher. Sara R. Collins, Paying More for Less, Older Adults in the Individual Insurance
Market, COMMONWEALTH FUND, June 2005, available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr-do
c/841 collins olderadults ib_.06-30-2005.pdf.
n2 See Hall, supra note 103, at 448.
113 In 2004, plan deductibles averaged $287 for PPO preferred providers and $558 for PPO
nonpreferred providers for individuals with single-coverage employee health benefits. Kaiser Family
Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits, 2004, chart 14,
available at http://www.kff.orglinsurance/7148/upload/Employer-Health-Benefit-Survey-2004-
Chartpack.pdf.
114 Reden & Anders, supra note 107.
155 See generally Dawn M. Gencarelli, Health Insurance Coverage for Small Employers,
NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM (Apr. 2005), available at
http://wvww.nhpf.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Details&key=560.
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conventional insurance.1 16 HSAs and HDHPs are thought to be more attractive to
low-risk subscribers because they are less likely to exhaust their high deductibles
and therefore more likely to build up substantial savings in their accounts. Also,
high-risk people are less likely in general to make any change in their health
insurance, so at least initially any new type of policy, whatever kind it is, will tend
to attract people who are healthier than average.117 HSA/HDHP advocates, on the
other hand, argue that the flexibility available to HSA holders will be attractive to
the chronically ill, as will be the absolute caps the MMA imposes on out-of-pocket
expenses and lower premiums. 118 They also argue that the cost control incentives
and greater freedom of choice under HSA/HDHPs will make insurance more
affordable to all." 9 Even if the price of HDHPs initially is artificially low due to
favorable risk selection, this advantage will tend to be neutralized over time as
sicker people in higher-priced plans decide it is to their advantage to switch.
Experience to date does not conclusively settle this dispute. Preliminary reports
are based on only a few employers or insurers, using forms of spending accounts and
high-deductible plans that predate the MMA and differ significantly from
HSA/HDHPs.' 20 This limited evidence shows no strong signs of risk selection
measured by the age or chronic illness of employees who choose different plans,' 2'
but does show some indication of risk selection based on the health care utilization
in the year prior to choosing a plan.'22 There is also some evidence that wealthier
and better educated people are disproportionately choosing HSAIHDHPs.12 1 It
makes sense that wealthier people would choose MMA compliant HSA/HDHPs
because the wealthy benefit more from the MMA tax deductions and are better able
to cover high deductibles out of their income and assets. Insofar as there is a
connection between socio-economic status and health status, this may presage
further segmenting of the risk pool. Still, it is easy to overestimate or exaggerate the
extent of possible adverse selection,124 and so far large price advantages have not yet
emerged for HSA/HDHPs. In fact, one initial study found that utilization of
116 See Gail Schearer, Commentary-Defined Contribution Health Plans: Attracting the Healthy
and lVell-Off, 39 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1159 (2004); Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans
Satisfy Patients? Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK L.
REV. 485, 511 (2004); Barbara T. Dreyfuss, Cheap Trick, AMERICAN PROSPECT. Sept. 1, 2004,
available at http:llwww.prospect.orglweblpage.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleld=8345;
Beth Fuchs and Julia James, Health Savings Accounts: The Fundamentals, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY
FORUM 24-27 (Apr. 2005), available at http:llwww.nhpf.org/pdfs bplBP_HSAs_04-1 1-05.pdf.
"7 Hall, supra note 63, at 376-88.
8 See, e.g., Herzlinger, supra note 2, at 119-120, 157-9.
119 See Consumer-Driven Plans Can Reduce Number of Uninsured, Panelists Say, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY (May 4, 2005).
120 See generally Anne K. Gauthier & Carolyn M. Clancy, Consumer-Driven Health Care:
Beyond Rhetoric with Research and Experience, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1049 (2004), available at
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.111 1/j. 1475-6773.2004.00272.x.
121 See Stephen T. Parente et al., Roger Feldman, & Jon B. Christianson, Employee Choice of
Consumer-Driven Health Insurance in a Multiplan, Multiproduct Setting, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES.
1091 (2004), available at http:llwww.blackwell-synergy.com/doilfulllI 0.111 1/j. 1475-
6773.2004.00275.x.
'2 See Laura A. Tollen et al., Risk Segmentation Relating to the Offering of a Consumer-
Directed Health Plan: A Case Study of Humana Inc., 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1167 (2004),
available at http:l/www.blackwell-synergy.eom/doilfullll 0.111 I/j.1475-6773.2004.00281 .x.
123 See Gail Shearer, Defined Contribution Health Plans: Attracting the Healthy and Well Off,
39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1159 (2004), available at http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/doi/full/10.111 1/j. 1475-6773.2004.00280.x.
124 See generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L. J. 1223 (2004).
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expensive hospital services increased much more in a consumer-driven health plan
than in a conventional plan chosen by other employees at the same firm.
125
Still, states must be prepared for the possibility that HDHPs will attract a
substantially healthier-than-average population. Insurers and employers consider
this a real possibility and take steps to counteract it within larger employer pools,1
26
either by offering consumer-driven plans only as the sole option to a workforce, or
by increasing rates the same average amount for all plan types rather than charging
employees based on the actual rates of utilization for the particular plan type they
choose. These self-help measures work well enough in larger employer groups, but
for small employer and individual purchasers, insurance market reforms attempt to
accomplish the same general results. In particular, rating rules, such as community
rating or rating bands, limit the extent to which an insurer may vary its rates among
subscribers based on their individual health status. 2 7 If HDHPs cover mainly low-
risk people, however, insurance premiums will more directly reflect individuals'
underlying medical risk because higher risk subscribers will remain in conventional
types of policies. Therefore, if HDHPs end up segmenting low versus high-risks
into different types of policies, then the goals of rating reforms will be eroded even
if insurers charge each person the same rate for the type of policy they purchase.
Accordingly, states concerned about access to coverage by sicker people might
choose to regulate HDHP premiums to assure that lower prices for these policies
reflect only their leaner benefits and not the better inherent health of the people who
choose to purchase these policies.
Most of the regulators we interviewed felt that risk segmentation was not a
pressing problem and that the rating issue just identified had not proven to be
problematic. Several regulators were not certain how exactly the state's rating rules
apply to HDHPs since they left this issue to the expert judgment of trained actuaries.
Those we spoke to who had actuarial expertise said, however, that so far their rating
rules have not required insurers to spread risk between HDHPs and more
conventional health plans. Instead, most felt it was appropriate, and actuarially fair,
to base the premiums for each policy type on the health care costs and utilization
generated by each policy's benefit structure and risk pool. Several regulators
acknowledged that problems might develop under this approach if substantial risk
segmentation were to emerge, and one regulator in New Jersey was very concerned
about this based on the risk segmentation that had already occurred in the individual
(non-group) market between plans with $250 and $1000 deductibles. Most other
regulators, however, noted that high-deductible plans of some form have been in the
market for a number of years without any serious problems, and MMA qualified
plans are too new to know whether they will produce any greater concern. A
Pennsylvania regulator felt that, if problems arose, there is only a limited amount
under that state's fairly loose rating laws that could be done to counteract risk
segmentation.
One reason this issue may not have emerged as a regulatory problem is that the
major insurers may not be attempting to take advantage of any favorable risk
123 Stephen T. Parente et al, Evaluation of the Effect of a Consumer-Driven Health Plan on
Medical Care Expenditures and Utilization, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1189 (2004), available at
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/1 0.111 l/j.1475-6773.2004.00282.x.126 See Jon R. Gabel, Heidi Whitmore, Thomas Rice & Anthony T. Lo Sasso et al., Employers'
Contradictory Views about Consumer-Driven Health Care: Results from a National Survey, W4
HEALTH AFFAIRS 210 (2004), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/
abstract/hlthaff.w4.210vl.
127 Hall, supra note 63.
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selection. Several insurer representatives we spoke to said that PPO products are
rated as a single risk pool in each market, adjusting only for deductible levels and
other benefit differences, rather than pricing HSA plans as an entirely separate risk
pool from other offerings. This appears to be sound actuarial practice, especially
when new products are first offered without enough experience and size to provide
"actuarial credibility" for a separate rating structure. It remains to be seen, however,
whether major insurers will continue rating PPO products as a single risk pool once
HSA-qualified plans grow in size and popularity. Past experience with other forms
of community rating predicts that rating practices can change quickly in response to
pressure from competitors who decide to seize on lower risk pools as a pricing
advantage in the marketplace,128 and at least one insurer we spoke to already rates its
HSA/HDHPs separately from other PPO products.
Another reason regulators may have refrained from scrutinizing rating practices
for HDHPs is the growing disillusionment with traditional approaches to expanding
access to coverage, which we detected in several quarters. Regulators seemed very
sensitized to the "zero-sum" logic that, for every high-risk subscriber whose rates
are lowered by regulation, several lower risk subscribers must pay higher rates,
which at the margin may deter some of them from purchasing any insurance. The
insurance market reforms of the 1990s have not succeeded in greatly expanding
access overall, and coverage levels continue to erode.129  Therefore, regulators
appear willing to try approaches such as HSA/HDHPs that might make insurance
dramatically more affordable for average purchasers. They are, therefore, reluctant
to regulate access to these policies too closely.
High-risk pools, currently offered in about two thirds of the states, represent
another effort to make health insurance available to all.130 High-risk pools offer
health insurance coverage to persons who are not otherwise insurable at a premium
that is usually set at some multiple of average premiums in the state, typically
ranging from 125% to 150%.131 These premiums will not usually cover the cost of
insurance for high-risk subscribers, and are supplemented by surcharges on insurers
or through tax revenues.
132
A number of states are currently offering or are considering HSA-qualified
plans in their high-risk pools.,33 Virtually all states with risk pools currently offer
plans with deductibles high enough to qualify for HDHP status.134 Indeed, many
offer plans with deductibles up to $5,000 or $10,000. Two issues, however, keep
people insured by these plans from qualifying for HSA tax subsidies under the
MMA. First, a number of high-risk plans have lower deductibles for drugs, since
'2 See, e.g., R. CUNNINGHAM III AND R.M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A HISTORY OF THE
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM (Northern Illinois University Press 1997).
129 See generally STATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORM: TOWARD INCLUSIVE AND
SUSTAINABLE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS (Alan C. Monheit & Joel C. Cantor eds., 2004).
"130 See COMMUNICATING FOR AGRICULTURE AND THE SELF-EMPLOYED, COMPREHENSIVE
HEALTH INSURANCE FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS - A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS, 25 (18th ed.
2004/2005) [hereinafter COMMUNICATING FOR AGRICULTURE].
'31 Id. at 13. See also SelfEmployedCountry.com, State Health Insurance High-Risk Pools:
Serving People Denied Insurance Coverage, http://www.selfemployedcountry.org/riskpools.html (last
visited Sept. 30, 2005).
132 COMMUNICATING FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 130, at 12.
3 Communicating for Agriculture and the Self-Employed's report for 2004-2005, lists nine
states that reported that they were in the process of establishing HSA-qualified plans or already had
one, two additional states with legislation pending to authorize HSA plans, and ten additional states
that reported researching or considering HSA plans. See id. at 7.
114 Id. at 28.
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many people in these pools have a chronic illness that requires expensive
medication.135 Second, the HDIiPs offered by several state high-risk pools are also
"bare bones" policies that have higher out-of-pocket maximums than those allowed
by the MMA.1
36
States that offer MMA compliant policies, however, need to consider how the
cost of HSA contributions should be weighed, if at all, in setting the amount the risk-
pool participant pays for coverage. As noted above, premiums for high-risk pool
policies are usually set at some multiple of average premiums for a policy offering
comparable coverage in the non-group market;137 thus a judgment needs to be made
as to how to fit HSA contributions into this formula. To date, all of the states seem
to be setting the price for the HDHP either by reference to the cost of other non-HSA
HDHPs in the market (adjusted for the different benefit structure of HSA-linked
HDHPs) or with reference to other MMA-compliant HSA-linked HDHPs. In either
case, the cost of the HSA is not taken into account, but is simply treated as one
optional way through which the purchaser of the high-risk pool policy can meet the
deductible. An alternative approach would be to add the cost of the HSA
contribution to the HDHP premium to reach a total cost of the combined HSA and
HDHP, and to subsidize this total expense to the extent it exceeds a certain cost (for
example 125% of the average combined cost of HSA contributions and HDHP
premiums in the non-group market). This approach might yield a greater subsidy for
HSAs, and might prove attractive to a state that strongly supports HSAs as a matter
of public policy, but apparently no state has done this yet. Rather, they are content
to subsidize the ,high deductible policy, and let the policy holder worry about
funding the HSA.
A final way states might, in theory, promote access using HSAs is to mandate
that employers offer them or fund them at certain levels. Ordinarily, the possibility
of an employer insurance mandate must be rejected out of hand because it seems to
fly so directly in the face of ERISA preemption, which prevents states from
mandating employer-funded benefits.138 This possibility has theoretical plausibility,
however, because of a Department of Labor ruling, noted above,139 that HSAs are
not employee benefits subject to ERISA jurisdiction even when employers fund
them. Therefore, logically, ERISA would not preempt state mandates of employers
relating to HSAs. We queried regulators, insurers, and others about whether this
possibility had occurred to them or had come up in discussions, and consistently
were told that it had not. Several people commented that this was an interesting and
plausible idea, but, as one insurer representative joked, "please don't tell anyone
else," for fear that it might open up entirely new avenues for state regulation in an
area that currently is seen as blissfully below the states' radar screens. Another,
however, observed that if any state tried to do this the Department of Labor would
rapidly reconsider its non-preemption position.
135 Id. The Department of the Treasury does not permit tax subsidies for HSAs where the HSA
owner has a low deductible pharmacy plan, Rev. Rul. 2004-38, but does allow transition relief to
allow persons with low deductible pharmacy plans to qualify for HSAs until January 1, 2006.
6 See id. at 7.
", See id. at 17.
138 See Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), Aff.d mem, 545 U.S. 801
(1981).
139 Dep't of Labor, Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-1 (Apr. 7, 2004), available at
www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab_2004- l.html.
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VI. FEDERALISM REVISITED: THE STATE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO
THE MMA HSA/HDHP PROVISIONS
Overall, the states' initial response to the MMA has been quite remarkable.
Most states have responded affirmatively to the latest federal legislation, despite its
lack of explicit compulsion, by removing any regulatory barriers to qualified
HDHPs. Many states have gone further, adopting or modifying state income tax
laws to supplement the federal incentives with state incentives for the purchase of
HSAs and HDHPs. Given the dismal fiscal environment that most states have been
dealing with in the recent past, and the reluctance of the states to otherwise commit
funds to expand health care access, these tax subsidies are quite significant. With a
few notable exceptions-in particular Califomia, New York and New Jersey-the
states seem generally supportive of consumer-directed health care and reluctant to
impose regulatory burdens on its progress.
Perhaps the experience with managed care regulation has caused most states to
lose their taste for insurance regulation; or perhaps the receptive regulatory response
is explained by the newness of the HSA/HDHP product and thus the lack of
experience with problems it might cause. Whatever the explanation, the new
approach to federalism in insurance regulation evidenced by the MMA appears to
have been very successful. At least for the moment, the lure of tax incentives has
been sufficient to launch HSA/HDHPs successfully in most states without the need
for either direct preemption of state law or the imposition of direct federal regulation
of insurance, thus avoiding all of the friction and controversies that have
accompanied these strategies under ERISA or HIPAA. The few states that have
refused so far to jump on the bandwagon have principled reservations about
consumer-directed health care that are appropriately respected by this more passive
federal approach. Thus in the end, the MMA seems a very promising model of
incentive-based federalism in health insurance regulation.
It is too early, however, to know for sure what the full regulatory impact of
HSAs/HDHPs will be. We may be at much the same place we were in the late 1980s
with respect to managed care, when we were still quite innocent of the problems it
posed. A few years later, the managed care backlash hit and state legislatures
responded with a host of new regulatory statutes. 140  A decade from now, if
HSAs/HDHPs take off with the speed and force that their advocates predict we may
see a very different regulatory environment.
Advocates of consumer-driven health care will argue that state or federal
regulation of HSA/HDHPs is not necessary because the problems that afflict other
types of insurance are either nonexistent or greatly reduced in their salience with
respect Ao HSA/HDHPs. We have outlined a variety of areas, however, in which
traditional regulatory concerns may still emerge. Solvency concems are still
relevant to the extent that insurers will be managing HSA accounts. Health policy
concerns are raised by fears that HSAs will attract mainly healthier people and will
work to the disadvantage of those with chronic illness. Also, HSA compliance
requires that states undo benefit mandates that were adopted with public health goals
in mind. Finally, concerns about consumer protection and managed care are still
140 See FURROW, supra note 52, at 614-33 (describing these laws); Hall, supra note 103
(same).
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relevant because of the complexity of HSA/HDHPs and because most of them still
employ a range of established managed care controls.41
There is at least one important difference between managed care and
HSA/HDHPs that suggests consumer-driven health care may be less heavily
regulated than managed care. Professionals and providers-most notably doctors-
saw managed care as a threat, but they see HSAs/HDHPs as an opportunity. There
is a long history of organized medicine opposing managed care in the United States
because it subjects the professional autonomy of physicians to external control.'
42
Organized medicine also opposed managed care because it limits patients' free
choice of providers. By contrast, organized medicine has long supported HSAs and
iIDHPs.143 On their face, HSAs would seem to guarantee absolute freedom in
choosing providers. They impose no constraints on physician practice. No
utilization reviewers need be looking over the doctor's shoulder while the patient
spends his or her HSA funds. No claims reviewers will second-guess doctors'
charges. Patients will have ear-marked funds from which to pay physicians directly
and without delay at the time of service. In short, physician autonomy-both clinical
and economic-will be absolute. Doctors will answer only to patients' demands and
willingness to pay, and surely patients with money set aside for health care will not
refuse services recommended by their trusted physicians.
Physicians may end up being unpleasantly surprised. Collecting from HSAs
may prove more difficult than they might expect. Some patients will not pay their
bills on time, even from their HSAs. Moreover, once HSAs are exhausted but
deductibles have not yet been reached, patients are on their own. Most bankruptcies
are currently driven in part by medical debt, and most persons bankrupted by
medical debt are insured.144  One can predict that the incidence of medical
bankruptcy will increase as deductibles get larger, and that physicians and providers
will often end up being unsecured creditors.
Further, relationships between providers and HDHP companies are likely to be
as complicated as are their current relationships with managed care companies.
HDHPs still need to conduct some form of claims review to determine when the
deductible has been mdt. Plans are also still concerned that deductibles not be
exhausted too quickly, and they continue to impose pre-approval or other utilization
"4 Advocates of consumer-driven health care believe that it greatly reduces insurers' need to
manage the costs of care because, as long as subscribers are under the HDHP deductible, they are
spending their own money. This argument is contestable for several reasons, however. See Hall &
Havighurst, supra note 76. First, even high deductibles cover only a moderate portion of total health
care spending, due to the concentration of spending among those with chronic illness or catastrophic
expenses. For instance, people who spend more than $5000 a year on health services account for more
than 70% of total medical costs. See Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health
Care Expenditures, Revisited, 20 HEALTH AFF. 9 (Mar./Apr. 2001). Moreover, the problem of
provider-induced demand may be only slightly ameliorated by high deductibles, since patients are still
largely dependent on their physicians in making health care spending decisions. See Joseph P.
Newhouse, Consumer-Directed Health Plans and the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, 23
HEALTH AFF. 107 (Nov./Dec. 2004). This is why most insurers still continue to use traditional
managed care tools such as networks and utilization review to control costs even with HDHPs.
142 Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care
Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988).
143 See, e.g., Donald J. Palmisano et al., Expanding Insurance Coverage Through Tax Credits,
Consumer Choice, and Market Enhancements: The American Medical Association Proposal for
Health Insurance Reform, 291 JAMA 2237 (2004).
'44 David U. Himmelstein et. al., MarketiWatch: Illness And Injury As Contributors To
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF. (Feb. 2, 2005),
http:l/content.healthaffairs.orglcgilcontent/fulllhlthaff.w5.631DC1.
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review requirements in determining whether expenses are covered and count against
the deductible and the out-of-pocket maximum. Therefore, providers still need to
ensure that patients receive needed approvals before services are rendered.' 45
Network providers who have a discount arrangement with an HDHP insurer may
also find themselves obligated to refund to the patient money collected from the
HSA in excess of the discount. Even out-of-network providers whose charges are
payable in full from the HSA may need to inform their patients that only part of the
charges count against the HDHP deductible. In short, life may not be as rosy for
providers under HSAs and HDHPs as they have hoped.
Some consumers are also likely to eventually have bad experiences with
HSA/HDHPs. Some consumers who spend their HSAs quickly on "qualified
medical expenses" that do not count against their deductible will be shocked and
surprised when they encounter serious and unexpected medical problems and realize
that they still have far to go to meet their deductible. Consumers who go out-of-
network or who fail to get utilization review approval are also in for similar
surprises. The first time that an insurer who administers HSAs becomes insolvent,
subscribers will be shocked to learn that they have nowhere to turn to recover the
loss of their personal funds, and that no regulator was there to make certain this did
not happen. Finally, persons with high-cost medical care who prefer low-deductible
health insurance policies may find those policies increasingly unaffordable if low-
risk subscribers move to HSA/HDHP policies.
If providers and consumers become upset, the media is likely to get involved as
well. If problems become sufficiently widespread, we may end up with nightly new
stories, newspaper exposes, movies, and New Yorker cartoons about consumer-
directed health care, similar to those directed at managed care in the mid-1990s.'
46
Congressional and state legislative hearings and new legislation may follow.
Perhaps. Perhaps not. But it would probably be best for everyone concerned-
consumers, providers, insurers, state regulators, consumer-driven health care
advocates and skeptics-if we think through the potential issues raised by HSAs and
HDHPs ahead of time instead of making policy in the midst of a media frenzy.1
47
Many believe in retrospect that managed care could have been better regulated had
managed care policy not been made this way.' 48 The "light touch" approach to
federalism found in the MMA HSA legislation leaves regulatory responsibility
squarely with the states. For consumer-driven health care to avoid the problems that
attended managed care regulation, it is essential that the states think through all of
the regulatory issues it presents sooner rather than later. We hope that this paper
will serve as an initial contribution toward reasoned dialogue about how the states
should appropriately regulate HSAs and HDHPs.
145 Providers who are contractually obligated to notify insurers or get preapproval before
providing certain products or services and who fail to do so may find themselves barred from billing
the patient's HSA under their contract with the HDHP insurer.
"146 Mollyann Brodie, Lee Ann Brady & Drew E. Altman, Media Coverage of Managed Care:
Is There a Negative Bias? HEALTH AFFAIRS 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1998), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/l7/l/9; Karen Ignagni, Covering a Breaking Revolution:
The Media and Managed Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS 26 (JAN.-FEB. 1998), available at
http:l/content.healthaffairs.orglcgi/reprintl17/l1/26.
147 It is also important that insurers and state and national regulators and policy-makers do
whatever they can to educate consumers, providers, employers, and the public about how HSAs and
HDHPs operate and their advantages and disadvantages, so that those who purchases these products
do not have unrealistic expectations about them and cannot later justifiably claim unfair surprise.
148 See sources cited supra note 90 and accompanying text.
